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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
STATE OF UTAH, \ 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 1 
VS. i 
RICHARD ALLEN BRADSHAW, 
Defendant-Appellant. 1 
1 Case No 
f 14060 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
The defendant, Richard Allen Bradshaw, was 
charged with interfering with a police officer. Said defen-
dant pled not guilty. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
This action was appealed from the Justice of the 
Peace Court, Milford Precinct, from a Judgment of the 
Justice of the Peace, E. L. Smith, finding the defendant 
guilty and said action was tried in Beaver County before 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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the Honorable J. Harlan Burns and the jury returned a 
verdict of guilty. 
The defendant, Richard Allen Bradshaw, was sen-
tenced to six months in the Beaver County Jail and is 
presently incarcerated. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The defendant, Richard Allen Bradshaw, seeks a vac-
ation of the jury verdict and a judgment of not guilty 
notwithstanding the verdict of the jury or in the alterna-
tive, a new trial, and an immediate order of release from 
the Beaver County Jail. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Richard Allen Bradshaw was charged in the Com-
plaint with the following: 
Interference with arrest by law enforcement offi-
cial in that the said Richard Allen Bradshaw in-
tentionally interfered with the said Dennis B. Cox 
in Milford City, Utah, while the said Dennis B. Cox 
then being and acting as a law enforcement official 
for Milford City was attempting to affect an arrest 
of the said Richard Allen Bradshaw. 
In the instant case the jury was presented with one 
witness, a police officer for the City of Milford, named 
Dennis B. Cox. Officer Cox testified that he was a police 
officer for the city of Milford and had been for the two 
years last past and that he knew Richard Allen Bradshaw 
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and knew the address of Richard Allen Bradshaw" at the 
time of the arrest (TR 5,6), Officer stated at trial that he 
had a casual relationship with Mr. Bradshaw prior to the 
15th day of March, 1974, which was the time of the arrest 
(TR6). 
On the 15th day of March,, 1974, Officer Cox testified. 
that he was dressed in uniform and saw Richard Allen 
Bradshaw driving a car down Main Street, whereupon the 
officer turned on his red light and followed Richard Allen 
Bradshaw to a Conoco Station in Milford, Utah (TR 6, 7). 
The officer then testified on Page 7 of the Transcript: 
•, after you followed him into the station, 
then what happened? 
A I pulled up behind him. He left his vehicle and 
started to put gas in it with the gas pump. At 
that time I advised him that I had to write him 
a citation for driving under suspension and he 
finished his purchase of gas, went in and paid 
for it and got in his vehicle and left while I was 
writing the citation. 
The officer also testified that he pulled up behind Mr. 
Bradshaw and got out of his patrol car and that halfway 
between his patrol car and the Bradshaw car the officer 
advised Mr. Bradshaw that he would be written a ticket 
for driving under suspension (TR 7). The officer also tes-
tified that he did not ask Mr. Bradshaw for his drivers 
license nor did he ask Mr. Bradshaw to stay at the service 
station and that the above set forth conversation was the 
only conversation between Mr. Bradshaw and the officer 
prior to the time Mr. Bradshaw left the service station (TR 
12 ). 
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Officer Cox also testified that at, the time of the arrest 
Richard Allen Bradshaw had a valid drivers license and 
that he was not under suspension, nor had his license been 
revoked (TR 13, 14). 
The officer testified further that when Mr. Bradshaw 
left the Conoco Service Station that he was followed to the 
Milford Hotel where he was placed under arrest for inter-
fering with an officer, apparently because he refused to 
stay at the service station while the officer was writing a 
citation. 
The officer also testified that he cocked his pistol at 
that time and pointed the gun at Mr. Bradshaw because he 
was accused of driving on a suspended drivers license 
which he later found out was not suspended (TR 15). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO 
TAKE THIS CASE FROM THE JURY AND 
FIND THE DEFENDANT "NOT GUILTY" OF 
THE CHARGE BECAUSE THE STATE DID 
NOT CARRY ITS BURDEN OF SHOWING 
PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE ARREST. 
In the State of Utah peace officers are governed by 
Section 77-13-3, Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended), 
which provides as follows: 
77-13-3. By peace officers. — A peace officer may 
make an arrest in obedience to a warrant delivered 
to him; or may, without a warrant, arrest a person: Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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(1) For a public offense committed in his pres-
ence. 
(2) When the person arrested has committed a 
felony, although not in his presence. 
(3) When he has reasonable cause for believ-
ing the person to have committed a public offense, 
although not in his presence, and there is reasona-
ble cause for believing that such person before a 
warrant can be obtained and served may: 
(a) Flee the jurisdiction or conceal himself to 
avoid arrest, or 
(b) Destroy or conceal evidence of the commis-
sion of the offense, or 
(c) Injure another person or damage property 
belonging to another person. 
(4) When a felony has in fact been committed, 
and he has reasonable cause for believing the per-
son to have committed it. 
(5) On a charge, made upon reasonable cause, 
of the commission of a felony by the person ar-
rested. 
(6) At night, when there is reasonable cause to 
believe that he has committed a felony. 
In the instant case, a public offense was not commit-
ted in the presence of Officer Cox and therefore, Officer 
Cox did not have reason, justification, or probable cause 
for the attempted arrest. 
The arrest in the instant case does not fall under any 
of the exceptions set forth above. Number 3 might seem 
applicable at first glance, but under that exception, Of-
ficer Cox would not have to get a warrant if he had reason 
to believe that the defendant would flee or conceal himself 
to avoid arrest or destroy evidence or injure another per-
son. The evidence indicates that Officer Cox knew the 
defendant in a casual manner, knew where he lived and 
this exception would not apply. 
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There was no justification for the arrest and the ar-
rest was invalid, therefore, there can be no justification for 
charging the defendant with interference as set forth by 
the new Criminal Code. 
The officer in the instant case did not have sufficient 
probable cause to arrest or to detain this defendant. The 
only testimony concerning probable cause was illicited on 
cross-examination where the officer testified that he had 
reason to know the license of Mr. Bradshaw had been 
suspended, however, upon stopping the defendant, the 
officer did not ask to see the drivers license nor did he 
know whether Mr. Bradshaw had the license on his per-
son, and there is no proof, even under the preponderence of 
the evidence, that Mr. Bradshaw did not have his license 
at the time the officer told him he was going to write him a 
citation. The proof is to the contrary, as the officer admit-
ted; that Mr. Bradshaw's license was valid and was not 
suspended at the time of the arrest. Because there is no 
probable cause for the officer to determine that a public 
offense was committed in his presence, it is impossible for 
the defendant to be charged with interfering. 
In the case of State of Utah v. Lopez, 22 Ut.2d 257,451 
P.2d 772 (1969), the Utah Supreme Court stated that an 
officer must have probable cause before making an arrest 
and probable cause is not satisfied merely by showing that 
the officer acted in good faith, but the requirement of 
probable cause does not mean that the officer has to be 
sure he has enough evidence to establish guilt. In the 
instant case there is no evidence of probable cause. 
The California Supreme Court, in 1947, dealt with a 
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problem similar to the problem we have here, only it 
concerned the common law defense of resisting an unlaw-
ful arrest. That case isPeople v. Perry, 180 P.2d 465 (1947), 
and the Supreme Court of the State of California held that 
an officer may make an arrest for a misdeameanor with-
out a warrant only if the offense is committed or attemp-
ted in the officer's presence and that an arrest must be 
lawful or the person being arrested may use reasonable 
force in order to resist. 
Sometime later the legislature of the State of Califor-
nia passed a statute which is similar to the Utah Statute 
involved here and that statute was reviewed in the case of 
People v. Albert Allen Curtis, 74 Cal. Rptr. 173, 450 P.2d 
33 (1969). The facts in that case related to the legality of 
the arrest whether or not there was probable cause, and 
the Court found that an officer is under no duty to make an 
unlawful arrest and that the officer did not have probable 
cause. The Court then spoke to the statute dealing with 
the right to resist and stated words to the effect that a 
statute providing that if the person has knowledge, or by 
exercise of reasonable care, should have knowledge, that 
he is being arrested by a peace officer and provides that it 
is his duty to refrain from using force or any weapon to 
resist such arrest, is a statute meant at most to eliminate 
common law defense of resisting unlawful arrest and not 
to make such resistance a new substantive crime. 
The Court went on to state that the defendant in that 
case, who resisted the unlawful arrest, could only be con-
victed of assault or battery or whatever crime that he 
actually participated in by resisting and could not be 
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convicted of something caused by the statute concerning 
resistance of arrest. 
It is the contention of the defendant that the statute 
under which he was charged does not say that there does 
not have to be probable cause for the arrest, but only says 
that there does not have to be a legal basis for the arrest. 
The Supreme Court of New Mexico in the case of City 
ofAlburquerque v. Leatherman, 74 N.M. 780,399 P.2d 108 
(1965), stated that an arrest not justified by probable 
cause could be resisted with reasonable force. 
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah dealt with 
obstruction of justice in the case ofState v. Hurley, 28 U.2d 
248, 501 P.2d 111 (1972), in which case the defendant 
appealed a conviction stating that the officer was not 
discharging any duty of his office so as to invoke the 
statute concerning obstruction of justice. The Supreme 
Court of the State of Utah found that the officer had no 
interest in patrolling the area that he was patrolling and 
therefore, the officer was not discharging a duty of his 
office and did not invoke the statute. The same thing is 
argued by the defendant in the instant case because the 
officer was not performing or discharging any duty of his 
office by giving someone a citation for driving under a 
suspended drivers license when that defendant had a 
valid drivers license. Therefore, the statute we are dealing 
with should not be invoked to allow a new crime of resist-
ing arrest. 
The Supreme Court of California in the Curtis case, 
supra, seems to be saying that if an officer makes a mis-
take and does not properly discharge his duty, then that 
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officer cannot make up for that mistake by arresting a 
defendant unlawfully held for obstructing justice or inter-
fering when that defendant does not submit peaceably to 
the officer's demand. 
The last case in the State of Utah which this writer 
can find concerning obstruction of justice is State v. 
Ludlow, 28 U.2d 434, 503 P..2d 1210 (1972). In the 
Ludlow case, the officer charged the defendant with ob-
struction of justice because the defendant refused to bring 
a female employee out of a certain factory so that she could 
be served by the deputy sheriff in a small claims court 
action. Because of such refusal, the defendant was ar-
rested for obstructing an officer in the performance of his 
duty and the District Court quashed the Information and 
the State appealed. The judgment of the District Court 
was affirmed. 
In the instant case, the resistance, if it may be called 
that, of this defendant, is certainly not more than set forth 
under the facts of theLudlow case. The deputy in that case 
may not have been acting legally in requiring the defen-
dant to produce an employee and the officer in the instant 
case was not acting legally in arresting the defendant for 
something he had not done. 
In the Ludlow case, the defendant simply refused to 
conform to the demands of the officer and in the instant 
case, the defendant simply refused to conform to the de-
mands of the officer. Both cases are similar in many re-
spects, but the instant case is even stronger when dealing 
with the fact that the officer did not have probable cause to 
make an arrest or perform any other type of police func-
tion. 
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO 
FIND THAT DEFENDANT'S RIGHT AGAINST 
UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE 
WAS VIOLATED. 
The Utah Statute pursuant to which this defendant 
was arrested states as follows: 
Section 76-8-305. Interfering with arrest or deten-
tion. 
A person is guilty of a Class B misdemeanor 
when he intentionally interfers with a person rec-
ognized to be a law enforcement official seeking to 
affect an arrest or detention of himself or another 
regardless of whether there is a legal basis for the 
arrest. 
It is defendant's contention that this statute was writ-
ten in violation of Article 1, Section 14, of the Utah Con-
stitution which states: 
The right of the people to be secure in their per-
sons, houses, papers and effects against unreason-
able searches and seizures shall not be violated; 
and no warrant shall issue but upon probable 
cause supported by oath or affirmation, particu-
larly describing the place to be searched and the 
person or thing to be seized. 
Defendant also contends that the Utah Statute viol-
ates the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution of the 
United States of America. 
The contention of the defendant is supported by Terry 
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) which states that there is a 
seizure whenever a police officer accosts an individual and 
restrains his freedom to walk away. That case also states 
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that the Constitution does not forbid all searches and 
seizures but only unreasonable searches and seizures. 
Defendant contends that he has a constitutional right 
against any unreasonable seizure. This right of defendant 
is inconsistent with the statuteinacted by the Utah State 
Legislature concerning interference with an officer, be-
cause the officer may make an arrest or a seizure under 
that statute whether or not he has legal basis. The Utah 
Statute is inconsistent with and violative of the Constitu-
tion of the State of Utah and the United States of America. 
CONCLUSION 
The statute relied on by the State in this case may 
very well violate the Constitution of the State of Utah and 
of the United States of America, and more than that, the 
State has not shown probable cause for the detention of 
this defendant. 
Defendant was advised that he was to receive a cita-
tion for a suspended drivers license. Defendant left the 
area and was therefore charged with interfering with an 
officer. The State admits that the defendant had a valid 
drivers license at the time he was stopped by the officer. 
Defendant requests this Court to vacate the jury ver-
dict and to find defendant not guilty as a matter of law. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MICHAEL W. PARK 
110 North Main Street, Suite F 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
Attorney for 
Defendant-Appellant 
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